Assessing the Aftermath of the Iran-Israel War

A conversation with defense analyst Shahryar Pasandideh

The 13-day war between Iran and Israel was revealing in many respects about the capabilities and weaknesses of each side. On the Israeli side, the war demonstrated the impressive on-the-ground networks that Mossad has built inside Iran—networks glimpsed in past years during assassination operations targeting Iranian scientists and foreign officials. The Israeli Air Force was also able to operate with relative ease inside Iran during the conflict. The initial wave of surprise attacks succeeded in pinning down missile bases in western Iran and limiting the size of salvos the Iranians could fire. The psychological effect of the first day of operations was critical in shaping the narrative of the war, though the conflict ultimately had to be concluded with U.S. assistance.

For the Iranians, the war exposed major deficiencies in air defense and internal security and resulted in the deaths of numerous high-ranking IRGC officers. But it was not all negative: the conflict also showcased advances in Iran’s ballistic missile program—many of which successfully evaded Israeli and U.S./E3 missile defenses—as well as the institutional resilience of the present government. In addition to unprecedented scenes of missile attacks on Israeli population centers, in my observation the war appears to have galvanized anti-Israel sentiment among segments of Iranian society that had previously been ambivalent. Rather than generating demands for liberalization or support of the present leadership, the reaction has taken the form of calls for a more competent security state.

As I’ve written previously, the war did not paint a picture of overwhelming Israeli strength. Despite impressive tactical operations, the war highlighted Tel Aviv’s continued dependence on the United States and the European Union for strategic depth and security. Iran continued to fire ballistic missiles until the very last minutes of the war. Israel needed U.S. assistance to target critical nuclear sites, and saw its costly U.S.-supported missile defense systems strained in under two weeks of sustained use. The outcome of the war might have looked very different without ongoing U.S. support in defending against Iran’s missile barrages—especially given the narrow geography of Israel’s population centers.

This is not to downplay Israeli military ingenuity. But the reality is that small states are not structured for wars of attrition, whereas large ones can endure and reconstitute well past the point where their adversaries collapse from exhaustion. In much of Iran—particularly the east—daily life continued largely unaffected by the fighting, whereas on certain days the entire Israeli population had to enter bomb shelters.

That said, given the current political climate, Iran now faces a difficult and complex set of choices about how to proceed. The war ended in a ceasefire, not a lasting political agreement. As such it is reasonable to assume this was only one phase in what I have written will be a “forever war” between Tel Aviv and other countries in the region. Israel is likely to continue enjoying U.S. and European support for years to come—despite any long-term blowback from the war in Gaza—while Iran today remains strategically isolated.

There are a number of pressing questions to consider today, including whether Iran may seek out China as an alternate defense provider, the future path of its nuclear program, and how Israel-U.S. defense ties may shape conditions for the next round of conflict. To analyze the war’s military and strategic dimensions—and to consider how the respective militaries might adapt—I’m sharing a recent conversation I had with Shahryar Pasandideh. Shahryar is a military analyst I previously interviewed on the Drop Site podcast and someone I plan to work with more closely in future analysis of defense and open-source intelligence topics.

The conversation below has been lightly edited for clarity.

Defense analyst Shahryar Pasandideh

Can you give a brief overview of how the war began from a tactical standpoint?

Israel began the war with a surprise attack, which provided it with a series of decisive operational advantages. The opening moments saw Israel employ air-launched ballistic missiles at Iranian targets, likely from positions in Iraq or Syria, accompanied by covert ground operations conducted by Mossad operatives, Israeli special forces, and, most importantly, what appears to be a large number of local Iranian collaborators under the command of Mossad. These initial strikes were designed to degrade Iran’s national air defence network, Iranian command and control networks, and disrupt Iran’s ability to undertake a short-notice retaliatory strike operation, while Israel pursued one of its primary objectives, which was the assassination of several senior Iranian nuclear scientists. By initiating the war with a surprise attack, Israel was able to reduce the complexity and uncertainty of its expansive targeting plan. Iran was caught flat-footed, and the Israeli military was very well positioned to expand upon its initial momentum.

Media reports that emerged in the first days of the war indicate that Iran was planning to respond with a comprehensive retaliatory strike operation that would entail the launch of around 1000 ballistic missiles. With the number of available ballistic missile launchers being the bottleneck, it would appear that Iran intended to launch multiple very large salvos of ballistic missiles over a 24-48 hour timeframe. This is to say that Iran reportedly intended to launch multiple large ballistic missile salvos in a manner comparable to what we saw in Iran’s October 2024 ballistic missile strike operation against Israel. It is not clear whether Iran intended to launch jet-powered cruise missiles or propeller-driven strike drones in conjunction with 1000 or so ballistic missiles in this reportedly planned massive retaliatory strike operation.

How did the surprise attack undermine Iran’s retaliatory strategy based on ballistic missiles and strike drones?

By degrading Iran’s national air defence network and Iranian command and control networks, Israel appears to have severely degraded Iran’s ability to undertake this short-notice retaliatory strike operation. Moreover, the Israeli Air Force and Israeli and non-Israeli operatives within Iran targeted Iranian military units tasked with operating not only ballistic missiles but also cruise missiles and drones. On the opening night of the war, Iran reportedly launched 100 ballistic missiles. For comparison, Iran is understood to have launched around 180 ballistic missiles on 1 October 2024. It is not clear whether the smaller-scale salvo on 13 June 2025 reflected any conscious Iranian effort to preserve its degraded ballistic missile arsenal for as long as possible. It also bears emphasis that the targeted assassinations of some of Iran’s most senior military officers likely had the effect of at least temporarily paralyzing Iranian military command and control. The combination of the targeting of senior Iranian military leaders, the physical targeting of military communication facilities, and the likely employment of electronic warfare and cyberattacks, to say nothing of the potent de facto Israeli psychological warfare campaign, are likely to have had a major effect on the course of Iranian retaliatory operations in the opening days of the war.

While Iran is reported to have launched a total of around 550 ballistic missiles over the course of the war, Israeli reports indicate that Iran launched a total of around 1000 propeller-driven strike drones and some jet-powered versions of the well-known Iranian Shahed-136 strike drone design. The Israeli military also claims to have destroyed over 950 Iranian strike drones on the ground, which is to say, before these strike drones could have been launched. Although reports suggest that Iran launched around twice as many strike drones as ballistic missiles over the course of the war, reports indicate that the initial Iranian retaliatory efforts were also quite limited in numbers when it came to strike drones.

Although a larger Iranian retaliatory operation was expected, Israel’s decisive surprise attack quickly constrained Iran’s strike capabilities. Israeli strikes damaged and destroyed key infrastructure, including the access tunnels for Iran’s underground missile bases. With Iranian air defences in western Iran almost entirely neutralized, the Iranian units operating ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and strike drones appear to have quickly limited themselves to operating at night with the likely objective of avoiding detection by the vast majority of military and commercial imaging satellites in orbit. All things considered, Israel successfully curtailed the size and intensity of the ballistic missile attacks that Iran could sustain throughout the war.

Can you describe the nature of Iran’s ballistic missile strikes during the war?

After the initial fairly large salvos of ballistic missile and strike drone launches, Iran, whether by choice or circumstance, shifted to a comparatively far more modest but more sustainable campaign of ballistic missile launches in the days that followed. While the salvos were substantial in absolute terms—reportedly involving two to three dozen medium-range ballistic missiles on most days—they fell short of the intensity many analysts had predicted and the intensity that Iran had attained in its single-day strike operations in April and October 2024.

As the days passed, the Israeli military released a fast-growing library of videos that documented its targeting of Iranian ballistic missile launches—and some likely ballistic missile launcher decoys. These losses came on top of the unknown number of Iranian ballistic missile launchers and missiles that were either literally or functionally trapped inside Iran’s underground missile bases, which are understood to have been under near-constant Israeli surveillance and subject to regular overflights by both crewed and uncrewed armed Israeli aircraft. The cumulative result was a tapering off in Iranian ballistic missile launches, which signalled both a physical degradation of launch capability and an apparent psychological disincentive on the part of Iranian launch crews to venture out of concealed positions.

Who “won” the war in your view?

From a tactical and operational standpoint, there is little dispute that Israel inflicted far more damage and came out ahead. Iran’s military performance was notably weak in several key areas—most critically in air defense and internal security. However, evaluating any war purely through tactical outcomes—footage of destroyed missile launchers and the like— misses the larger political and strategic dimensions. Wars are not only fought by militaries; they are decided, continued, and concluded for political reasons by political leaders. These political decisions are shaped by a country’s self-assigned objectives and strategic goals These self-assigned objectives and strategic goals set the primary standard by which to assess success and failure.

Many Israeli actions in this war, and many public statements by senior Israeli officials, including the Israeli Prime Minister, indicate that fomenting internally driven regime change was one of Israel’s goals in this war. Insofar as regime change was one of Israel’s self-assigned objectives and strategic goals at the time the final decision was made to initiate this war with a surprise attack, Israel has evidently so far failed to achieve that outcome. Iran’s societal cohesion held in the face of the Israeli surprise attack and the accumulating civilian casualties that followed, even as Israeli officials, and less frequently American officials, made calls for Iranians to take to the streets and topple the Islamic Republic.

On the military front, Iran also retained enough capacity to continue launching ballistic missiles and strike drones even in the final days and hours of the 12-day war. Though the salvo sizes were much smaller than what Iran sustained in the opening days of the war, let alone in Iran’s two single-day strike operations in April and October 2024, Iran’s persistence highlighted the limits of Israel’s operational success.

That said, Israel and the U.S. managed to preserve a very robust missile defense umbrella over Israel, and Iranian barrages failed to consistently penetrate Israel’s ballistic missile defences and the decisive American backstop. This failed in large numbers, and against high-value targets in Israel that may have changed Iran’s fortunes in this war. Still, the fact that Iran retained any capacity to respond at all after such sustained attacks should raise questions about the extent of Israeli success at the tactical and operational levels, not least given the favourable military context brought about by the American-enabled Israeli surprise attack. While Israel achieved numerous tactical accomplishments and undoubtedly came out on top of Iran in this war, it ultimately fell short of decisively neutralizing Iran’s missile and strike drone capabilities, and certainly did not force an abject political capitulation from Tehran.

How did Israel’s allies augment its performance in the war, and how did Iran’s isolation shape its own performance in the conflict?

Iran entered the war largely isolated and self-isolating on the international stage. It lacks—and has not sought—formal military allies. While it has transactional relationships of convenience with both Russia and China, neither of these nations is committed to Iran’s defense, and Iran has no interest in getting caught up in the many problems that Russia and China themselves face. These relationships are primarily diplomatic and economic in nature. Neither Moscow nor Beijing offered Tehran meaningful assistance during the conflict.

In stark contrast, Israel benefited immensely from the backing of the United States, which has not only served as Israel’s long-time enabler but increasingly its enabler and active guardian since October 2023. American support is likely to have been pivotal, both in deterring Iran from undertaking any number of actions and in dramatically enhancing the quality and quantity of Israel’s ballistic missile defences through the forward deployment of land- and sea-based American ballistic missile defence systems.

One of the causes of the June 2025 Iran-Israel War was the ballistic missile defence backstop provided to Israel by the forward deployment of the American THAAD ballistic missile defence system in Israel. The Biden Administration undertook the unprecedented step of forward-deploying a THAAD battery to Israel in October 2024. The importance of this move cannot be overemphasized, given the likely depletion of Israel’s stocks of ballistic missile defense interceptors in April and October 2024. In the 12-day war, as in April and October 2024, several U.S. Navy destroyers equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile systems were deployed to bolster Israel’s ballistic missile defences. Together, these land- and sea-based American ballistic missile defence systems significantly enhanced Israel’s ability to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles, particularly when Iran was able to launch large salvos of ballistic missiles. The U.S. is also believed to have contributed in less visible ways, including satellite-based targeting support and cyber operations, although many of these contributions remain officially unconfirmed.

European countries may have provided Israel high-quality intelligence or at least facilitated preferential Israeli access to commercial satellite imagery—support that may not be fully military in nature but likely still shaped the course of the conflict. Additionally, Iran’s regional neighbors likely played a more passive but nevertheless impactful role: while none officially offered Israel aid, some may have quietly cooperated with Israeli or American efforts in the areas of air and missile defence, further underscoring Iran’s isolation.

Had the United States not deployed advanced missile defense systems and naval assets in advance, it is likely Israel would have faced far more difficulty absorbing Iran’s missile barrages. Without the American ballistic missile defense backstop in place, Israel also may not have initiated this war when and how it did. In this important respect, the U.S. can be said to have been Israel’s enabler and the forward-deployment of American ballistic missile defences to Israel can be characterized as an immediate—not underlying—cause of the June 2025 Iran-Israel War.

Some observers have suggested that Iran may follow the example of Pakistan and look to China as its main source of military equipment. Is going to Beijing a realistic option for Iranian leaders?

The China option is interesting not only because of China's advancements in military technology, but also because of Chinese-built weapons' strong performance during the India-Pakistan war. In the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia, Iran’s long-standing albeit occasional source of military equipment, is no longer able to supply many types of armaments—or at least, not at the speed that Iran or other countries would require. China meanwhile has dramatically closed the gap with not only Russia but also the United States in a wide range of military technologies, and has become a more desirable supplier for many types of systems.

Could China help Iran plug major capability gaps exposed during the war? That depends on many factors. First and foremost is the question of resources. Iran's financial resources are limited as a result of decades of economic sanctions and economic mismanagement. Although China may be willing to make a major concession to Iran and allow it to barter oil and natural gas resources in lieu of hard currency, this isn’t just a question of affordability—it’s a question of priorities. How does post-war Iran view its military needs? For example, the war revealed that Iran had spent far too much time preparing to fight the U.S. and GCC states, and not enough focusing on Israel. Otherwise, we would have seen a much greater concentration of air defenses in western Iran.

Can Iran turn to China for large-scale procurement of fighter aircraft or surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems? Let’s assume policy continuity in Iran, unlimited resources, and no logistical delays. Let’s also assume China agrees to sell Iran whatever it wants. Even then, how many fighter aircraft or SAMs would Iran have to acquire to fundamentally shift its military capabilities vis-a-vis Israel? Hundreds—if not more. And even then, Israel’s formidable air force would still have a good chance at neutralizing these assets on the ground and in the air given not only Israel’s advanced and ever-evolving American-guaranteed qualitative military superiority, but also the absence of allied air forces between the two countries to serve as a buffer.

One of the most important dynamics in the Iran-Israel War was the total inability of Syria and Iraq to even consider interfering with Israeli aerial operations. Around 1000 kilometers of Syrian and Iraqi airspace separate Iran and Israel—Tehran is around 1500 kilometers from Israel. Facing no threat whatsoever from either Syrian or Iraqi fighter aircraft and SAMs, Israeli Air Force fighter aircraft were able to forgo carrying many air-to-air missiles and focus on undertaking extremely long-range and long-endurance strike sorties against targets in Iran.

To avoid a repeat of the Iran-Israel War solely through the acquisition of fighter aircraft and SAMs from China—and any other country—Iran will likely have to procure and maintain 300–400 high-end competitive aircraft, along with a vast number of SAM systems suited to its expansive surface area and mountainous terrain. Should Iran exclusively pursue such an approach to improving its military capabilities, it would not be playing to its strengths, Israel will likely retain the upper hand in a future conflict, and Iran’s heavy investments will likely be wasteful. In sum, neither China nor Russia can offer Iran a quick and easy fix to the immense military shortcomings that were on full display in the war.

What are the prospects of Iran developing a nuclear weapon after the war?

This is perhaps the most consequential question facing Iran today—and one that has loomed for decades. As of now, the realized level of damage to Iran’s publicly known nuclear facilities is unclear. Based on current reporting, both the U.S. and Israeli governments appear to believe that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has not made a decision to pursue a nuclear breakout. However, these early assessments could be based on misleading or incomplete information and may change with time.

Despite the devastation Iran has suffered, in my view it is not advisable—strategically or practically—for Iran to pursue a nuclear weapon. This assessment is not rooted in fears of regional nuclear proliferation or concerns about the likelihood of nuclear war with Israel or the United States. Rather, it is based on the immense challenges Iran will face in developing and implementing a viable and sustainable nuclear posture and strategy.

The most practical way for Iran to deliver a nuclear bomb is a ballistic missile. As the Iran-Israel War and Iran’s April and October 2024 single-day strike operations against Israel have demonstrated, successfully delivering a nuclear payload to Israel—and credibly threatening the ability to do so— in the face of Israel’s ballistic missile defence capabilities presents immense multi-faceted challenges for not only Iran’s nuclear capabilities but also Iran’s conventional military capabilities.

While there are ways that Iran may be able to overcome these formidable challenges, Iran’s resources are limited. Every country that has developed nuclear weapons has had to divert a significant portion of its military budget toward building and maintaining the arsenal, including research and development to avoid technological obsolescence. As a result, a nuclear-armed Iran may well be neither strong on the nuclear front nor strong on the conventional front, and such a nuclear-armed Iran will likely encounter the worst of all worlds and be worse off for it.

For Iran, which was already under severe economic pressure, the burden of maintaining a modern and viable nuclear deterrent would likely be immense. Unlike Pakistan or North Korea—states that developed nuclear weapons under unique geopolitical conditions—Iran will likely face even greater difficulties in formulating and implementing a viable and sustainable nuclear strategy. It bears emphasis that Iran will be a late adopter of nuclear weapons—Israel has a nearly sixty-year head start and will likely further evolve both its nuclear capabilities and its ballistic missile capabilities even as Iran navigates what is likely to amount to a protracted period of nuclear infancy. Given these and other considerations, nuclear weapons are not necessarily as attractive an option as many may think, even in the aftermath of the Iran-Israel War.

What should Iran do instead next to restore its strategic position?

Supposing that Iran has $30–40 billion to spend, rather than investing it all in Chinese—or Russian—military equipment, it would be wiser to primarily double down on its existing strike capabilities—namely strike drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles—which offer far greater deterrent and coercive value not least in the aftermath of the Iran-Israel War. Again, presuming policy continuity, Iranian leaders would also be foolish not to double down on what remains of the Axis of Resistance and expand the strike capabilities of these non-state armed groups. One outcome of the war is that Iran needs its non-state allies across the Middle East more than ever.

If Iran were to restart production of the Kheibar Shekan ballistic missile, and assuming it could manufacture 50 units per month, a rational course of action would be to keep around half of that monthly output to replenish domestic stockpiles and transfer the other half—around 25 missiles per month—to Ansarallah in Yemen. In this moment of strategic weakness, the marginal value of deploying an additional missile inside Iran is likely lower than the value of enhancing the capabilities of regional partners, above all Ansarallah. Iranian strike munitions that are, in effect, forward-deployed to northern Yemen allow Iran to escape the restrictions imposed upon its by Iran’s geography/borders and force Iran’s regional adversaries—the U.S., Israel, and the Gulf Arab states—to reorient part of their air and missile defences to counter the enhanced threat emanating from northern Yemen In so doing, strike munitions launched from Iranian territory are likely to have an enhanced ability to penetrate adversary air and missile defences.

Improving the capacity of non-state allies like Ansarallah complicates Israeli, American, and Gulf Arab military planning, thereby offering Iran a relatively cost effective and fast way to reestablish its deterrence and coercive capabilities that plays to its existing strengths.

Iran has undertaken a very ambitious foreign policy of confronting both Israel and the U.S., despite being a middle-power with no comparable alliances. This has imposed great costs on Iran and led it to a situation where it faces many onerous choices. Can Iranian leaders continue on this path?

Countries in Iran’s position often consider retrenchment as a way to reduce risk and buy time. This is one policy path open to Iran—though there are many shades between total retreat and complete persistence on the current path.

Retrenchment would likely require Iran to lower the dial on its offensive strike capabilities and decrease the level of threat perceived by Israel, the United States, and Gulf Arab states. Whether Tehran takes this route will likely depend in large part on how it manages its nuclear program. Any move toward weaponization and any attempt at reestablishing prior levels of nuclear latency will likely escalate tensions and possibly result in the resumption of active hostilities with Israel and perhaps the United States. However, if Iran instead signals that certain areas are up for negotiation—or pursues unilateral de-escalation in others—it may gain the strategic breathing room it needs to focus on improving its economy, which is the only way that Iran can sustain a long-term military competition and invest first in defensive military capabilities, such as air defences, and later in offensive strike capabilities, including a much larger and more sophisticated arsenal of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and strike drones at a much later date.

Ultimately, every nation must match its ambitions to its available means and do so while mindful of both the intentions and capabilities of its adversaries. If Iran’s capabilities have been degraded or are no longer adequate to pursue prior goals, then a serious reassessment of its strategic objectives may be in order. There are historical examples of countries that refused to alter their goals and still prevailed—but those are exceptions, not rules.