Some Thoughts on China and U.S. in Conflict

"The Avoidable War" has convinced me for the first time war may be inevitable

A future war between China and the United States is among the top apocalyptic expectations on the minds of elites in both countries. I have always been dubious about the likelihood of such a war coming to pass. Both countries are major trading partners, interlinked in myriad ways that would make a war not just painful, but unprofitable. Whatever differences may exist between a rising power and existing one, surely it makes no sense to overturn things in a manner that leaves everyone worse off?

I’ve read many books on the Thucydides Trap ostensibly driving the tension between these two countries. Ironically, however, I never really believed a war was likely until reading a recent book arguing for how to avoid one.

“The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping's China” by veteran Australian diplomat and Sinologist Kevin Rudd is a guide to the evolution of the U.S.-China relationship. In making his case that a conflict is becoming much more likely, Rudd lays out a number of factors that animate Xi Jinping’s thinking about the matter, including China’s perceived economic, diplomatic, legal, military, and environmental goals. Rudd is a Mandarin speaker who spent many years in official circles in China and whose proximity to Chinese elite decision-makers is as privileged as Henry Kissinger’s was in the 1960s.

Although, as the title suggests, the book is basically a plea not to go to war, Rudd lays out so many structural conflicts between the two countries currently in play that I would find it a miracle if they do not wind up coming to blows. The level of hatred and distrust on both sides has become intense, and is unlikely to abate because they are simply in a situation where the world, such as it exists, is not big enough to accommodate both their minimum prerogatives.

**

The U.S. effectively midwifed China’s emergence as a superpower by helping bring it into the World Trade Organization over two decades ago. The expectation was that as global markets opened up to China, the Chinese economy, as well as, eventually, the political system, would reciprocate by liberalizing in turn. That never happened. China took the benefits of global trade, while ruthlessly protecting its own industries and currency and consolidating more and more raw power into the structure of the Chinese Communist Party.

Americans, accordingly, felt that they had been had. They had moved their manufacturing base to a country that in their view had turned out to be hostile, or at least indifferent to its interests. They had helped a rival country become almost as rich and powerful as itself, and now feel a sense of fear mixed with betrayal.

China is a great civilization in its own right and sees its newfound wealth and power as merely a return to the historical norm. It has returned, however, to a world whose rules were written to privilege European and Americans interests and values. While continuing to ruthlessly promote its own domestic industries, it plans to rewrite international rules to its liking. This includes redrawing of national borders, enacted during a period of Chinese weakness and humiliation, that it never accepted nor considered natural.

In this light, China is obviously going to lay claim to the infamous Nine Dash Line in the South China Sea. Likewise, it is obviously going to reassert sovereignty over Taiwan, and disputed territories with Japan, South Korea, and India. That will just be the beginning of the makeover that they are planning to give the world.

Chinese leaders are highly cautious and have low time preference. Their doctrine is not to gamble, but to simple accumulate military, economic, and political strength to the point where, when the critical moment comes, its adversaries will ideally be forced to conclude that resistance is futile and capitulate without much struggle.

**

In the face of an ascending Chinese juggernaut, the question becomes, then, whether the U.S. will be willing to shoot first before its position becomes too dire. Losing Taiwan along with its overall alliance structure in East Asia would be a mortal blow to the post-WWII American way of life. The U.S. could theoretically retrench to a hemispheric defense strategy and divide the world between the West and China, but that would ultimately make it a dwarf at the mercy of a Chinese superpower.

If Americans are lucky, China will simply allow them to maintain enough wealth to continue consuming the goods that they manufacture. But in a world where China is the dominant power in Eurasia, the era of Americans setting the rules and striding the globe having the last say on affairs would simply be over. I think American elites may fight before they allow that to happen.

Rudd offers a number of deescalatory ideas, like having open communications where both sides can ensure they don’t cross each others red-lines. But they seem pretty weak and insufficient in comparison with the serious structural conflicts that he identifies.

While war is likely, I don’t think it is inevitable. Avoiding it will however probably require one side to simply surrender, while resigning themselves to containment and gradual decline.